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ABSTRACT 
Environmental policymakers face a dilemma, for the construction 
and operation of renewable energy facilities mitigates ecologically 
destructive climate change in the long term but often adversely affects 
species in the short term. This paper provides empirical, legal, and 
normative resources for analyzing what I call “species clash.” In most 
cases, renewable energy is much more helpful than harmful when it 
comes to preventing species extinctions, but the Endangered Species Act 
paradoxically poses a barrier to such species-preserving projects. 
Framing the benefits of renewable energy in terms of species 
conservation may not only help secure speedy and cost-efficient 
compliance with the Act, but also foster a more rational conservationism 
fit for an era of climate change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What if future ecologists look back and find that the deadliest 
animal in the history of the world was not an apex predator, like the 
wolf or lion, but the innocent, unhurried, and herbivorous Mojave 
desert tortoise? In 2011, the construction and operation of the world’s 
largest solar thermal plant1 came to a screeching halt for over three 
months as experts vigorously debated how to build in the Mojave 
desert without displacing more than thirty-eight of the charming 
reptiles in accordance with a permit granted under the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”).2 To comply with the law protecting the 
endangered tortoise, the final Ivanpah solar energy project was 
delayed and then scaled back by 12%.3 Renewable energy projects like 
Ivanpah are crucial for replacing fossil fuel energy sources that will 
cause ecologically-destructive climate change.4 On plausible 
assumptions, scientific models can be extended to estimate that the 
 
Copyright © 2021 Chase Hamilton. 
* I thank and credit Professor Michael Livermore for the idea that motivated this Note. See 
Michael A. Livermore, Climate Change and Endangered Species (lecture at Duke University 
School of Law, Oct. 16, 2019) (presentation on file with author). I received helpful comments 
from many, including Professors Michael Livermore, Rebecca Rich, and Jonathan Wiener. I also 
thank the many people who make it possible to dedicate one’s time to writing a law review article. 
All errors are my own. 
 1.  Katherine Tweed, World’s Largest Solar Thermal Plant Syncs to the Grid, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:06 PM), 
 https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/renewables/worlds-largest-solar-thermal-plant-
syncs-to-the-grid. Solar thermal plants use mirrors or lenses to concentrate sunlight and convert 
it into electricity. Ivanpah remains the second largest such facility; in 2018 it was eclipsed by the 
Noor/Ouarzazate Solar Power Station in Morocco.  
 2.  The Ivanpah solar facility was granted an Incidental Take Permit (ITP) under the ESA 
for up to thirty-eight tortoises. See infra Section II for a discussion of ITPs. After an 
environmental review of the project, the Fish and Wildlife Service found this was likely an 
underestimate, with about eighty tortoises likely to be affected. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL 
DIVERSITY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND BRIGHTSOURCE ENERGY, INC. REGARDING THE 
IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM PROJECT IN THE MOJAVE DESERT 3 (2011).  
 3.  Todd Woody, BrightSource Alters Solar Plant Plan to Address Concerns Over Desert 
Tortoise, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011, 12:20 PM), 
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/brightsource-alters-solar-plant-plan-to-address-
concerns-over-desert-tortoise/. 
 4.  See generally infra Section I. 
Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:50 PM 
Spring 2021] MODERNIZING CONSERVATIONISM 381 
delays and downsizing of the Ivanpah solar energy project to protect 
the desert tortoise will cause the extinction of more than 350 species 
due to environmental destruction from climate change.5 It is hard to 
imagine any other animal capable of killing so many species.6 
Of course, the real culprits here are not the tortoises but climate 
change and its contributors—us. It is widely accepted that the United 
States, along with the rest of the world, must shift away from fossil fuel 
energy sources to prevent or mitigate considerable global harms from 
greenhouse-gas-caused climate change.7 The Biden administration is 
pushing for the U.S. to become carbon-neutral by 20358 and this shift 
will require the rapid development of renewable, low-carbon energy 
sources.9 However, such projects must be built and operated in 
compliance with the well-intentioned ESA, which prohibits harming 
listed species.10 The ESA helpfully prevents the wanton destruction of 
endangered species, but it also poses barriers to renewable energy 
projects that would help keep species from becoming endangered and 
going extinct due to climate change. 
Discussion of the ESA and renewable energy projects reveals a so-
called “green clash” between two environmentally-friendly objectives: 
 
 5.  Under the original 440 megawatt (MW) solar facility plan the three-month delay 
represents a 110 MW loss; further, the cutback to a 392 MW facility returns 48 MW less for each 
year of the facility’s anticipated 50-year lifespan. Woody, supra note 3. Using well-regarded 
methods, climate science can estimate that every additional 7 MW coal installed to meet those 
energy demands can be expected to result in the extinction of a species due to climate change. See 
infra Section I. Estimating Renewable Energy’s Species-Preserving Effect. (110 MW + 48 MW * 
50 years) / 7 MW per species extinct = 358.57 species extinct. 
 6.  Contending with the tortoise for Most Dangerous Animal is the domestic cat, which kills 
more than 12 billion birds, reptiles, and rodents a year. Scott Loss et al., The Impact of Free-
Ranging Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the United States, 4 NATURE COMM. 1396 (2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms2380. Even with these numbers, the cat is known to have 
contributed to the extinction of only 33 species, about seven percent of what we can expect the 
tortoise to have caused in the Ivanpah incident alone. See Nogales et al., Feral Cats and 
Biodiversity Conservation: The Urgent Prioritization of Island Management, 63 BIOSCIENCE 804, 
805 (2013) (detailing cat-related extinctions).  
 7.  See generally infra Section I. 
 8.  WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT BIDEN SETS 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS 
POLLUTION REDUCTION TARGET AIMED AT CREATING GOOD-PAYING UNION JOBS AND 




 9.  U.S. Can Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions 80 Percent by 2050, Study Says, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Nov. 21, 2014), 
https://e360.yale.edu/digest/us_can_cut_greenhouse_gas_emissions_80_percent_by_2050_study_
says. 
 10.  Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2018). 
Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:50 PM 
382 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:379 
protecting endangered species and protecting the world from climate 
change.11 The exact reason the clash is “green,” however, is usually 
assumed or only vaguely described, resulting in a mismatch of “green” 
goals. The ESA is “green” because it aims to protect endangered 
species.12 Renewable energy is “green” because it helps protect the 
world from climate change, and most legal scholars fixate on the harms 
of climate change to humanity, not animals.13 Therefore the clash 
between the ESA and renewable energy is typically assumed to involve 
a tradeoff between human and animal interests, and the ESA almost 
never permits the sacrifice of endangered species for humanity’s sake.14 
But climate change threatens all of us, including animal species.15 To 
move beyond the vaguely “green” ethos of renewable energy, both the 
ESA and renewable energy should be framed in terms of species 
preservation—a “species clash.” This framing makes renewable energy 
and species conservation commensurable and is therefore the most 
promising route to facilitating ESA compliance using “green” 
justifications.16 But it can also be normatively disorienting for 
environmentalists who must now choose between two outcomes that 
will each result in the loss of something they value.17 
This paper makes empirical, legal, and normative arguments. The 
empirical claim, made in Section I for the first time with detail in legal 
literature, is that renewable energy projects have a “species-preserving 
effect”—projects that harm some members of endangered species in 
the short term will nevertheless save many more entire species from 
future extinction driven by climate change.18 The legal argument, made 
 
 11.  See Blair Warner, Overhauling ESA Private Land Provisions in Light of the Renewable 
Energy Boom on Federal Public Lands, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2014) (describing 
the competing policy goals of endangered species protection and renewable energy development 
as a “green clash”).  
 12.  See infra Section Giving Renewable Energy a Pass Through the ESA (describing the 
ESA’s purpose). 
 13.  See, e.g., Daniel Bertsch, When Good Intentions Collide: Seeking a Solution to Disputes 
Between Alternative Energy Development and the Endangered Species Act, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 
L.J. 74 (2011) (arguing that renewable energy is good for a variety of reasons, including fighting 
climate change, but not mentioning the benefits to animal species from such efforts).  
 14.  See generally infra Section II.  
 15.  See generally infra Section I.  
 16.  See generally infra Section III. 
 17.  See generally infra Section IV. 
 18.  Legal scholars have not attempted this task in detail. See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, The 
Biodiversity Paradigm Shift: Adapting the Endangered Species Act to Climate Change, 27 
FORDHAM ENV’T REV. 57, 63–73 (2015) (discussing various mechanisms of ecological destruction 
via climate change, but not attempting to quantify them in terms of the relative costs and benefits 
of renewable energy projects); J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the 
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in Sections II and III, is that the ESA currently acts as a substantial 
barrier to beneficial renewable energy development (Section II), but 
there is room under the statute to lessen that barrier in ways that do 
not simultaneously apply to oil, gas, and coal projects that produce 
more GHGs than they save (Section III).19 The normative argument, 
made in Section IV and relatively unexplored in the literature, is that 
it is preferable to save as many species as possible from climate change-
driven extinctions, even where it requires knowingly interfering with 
an endangered species today.20 
In whole, this paper aims to provide resources for analyzing the 
tension between renewable energy and endangered species. “Species 
clash” is an example of a risk-risk tradeoff.21 Policymakers tend to focus 
on singular target risks22—for example, the ESA agencies tend to focus 
on the present risk to listed species. But the real world is multi-risk, so 
reducing a target risk may incur countervailing risks or yield co-
benefits.23 Policymakers should confront the multiple risks and 
potential tradeoffs, weigh them, and select the policy option that will 
reduce overall risk.24 Acting under the ESA to reduce the target risk of 
 
Endangered Species Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1789 (2012) 
(assuming for the sake of argument that the overall species-preserving effect of renewable energy, 
which he calls the “wind power effect,” is positive but suggesting it is impossible to conclusively 
support this claim).  
 19.  Note that my claim is just that species-saving projects can bypass some hurdles set by 
the ESA—not that the ESA can be used proactively as a general ecosystem management statute. 
For criticism of the broader approach, see Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1792 (arguing that the ESA has 
an “emergency room” posture that makes it inappropriate for general ecosystem management).  
 20.  The normative dimension of a species clash is largely neglected in ESA scholarship. Four 
authors mention the issue, each arriving at different conclusions. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1793 
(suggesting that neither the ESA nor the ethics of intergenerational policy choices are well-
equipped for handling a species clash); John Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 88–92 (2013) (suggesting that a pass for renewables under 
the ESA would be bad for policy reasons); Robbins, supra note 18, at 103 (2015) (suggesting that 
we must be willing consider species trade-offs as a result of anthropogenic changes in the 
environment); Gregg Badichek, Resolving Conflicts Between Endangered Species Conservation 
and Renewable Energy Siting: Wiggle Room for Renewables?, 14 CONSILIENCE 1, 2 (2016) 
(explicitly assuming without argument that we should be willing to sacrifice some species for the 
sake of many). Other authors who discuss the ESA and species clash focus on human interests. 
See, e.g., Rachael Salcido, Rationing Environmental Law in a Time of Climate Change, 46 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 617, 643–44 (2015) (arguing the need for human survival makes it necessary to 
sacrifice endangered species for renewable energy development).  
 21.  See JOHN D. GRAHAM AND JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN 
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) (discussing risk-risk tradeoffs in detail).  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. See also Jonathan B. Wiener, Learning to Manage the Multirisk World, 40 RISK 
ANALYSIS 2137 (2020) (offering guidance on moving from single to multiple risks in analysis, 
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one species loss due to renewable energy projects may incur the 
countervailing risk of future species loss due to the added climate 
change from forestalling the renewable projects and extending the use 
of fossil fuels.25 Environmental policymakers have a responsibility to 
carefully consider all of an action’s foreseeable consequences, not just 
the ones that are most obvious or intuitive. 
Beyond the details, the broader point is that the effects of climate 
change are so magnitudinous that the benefits of mitigation efforts will 
often exceed the costs, even where those costs are immediate or 
otherwise bear on our consciences. The two spiritual goals of this paper 
are therefore to motivate efforts to effectively fight climate change and 
develop a more sensible and less self-defeating approach to 
conservation policy. 
I. ESTIMATING RENEWABLE ENERGY’S SPECIES-
PRESERVING EFFECT 
Greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions are the principal source of 
anthropogenic climate change.26 Fossil fuel combustion for energy is 
responsible for 75% of total anthropogenic U.S. GHG emissions,27 so 
the most promising route to fighting climate change is the development 
of renewable energy.28 Unfortunately, utility-scale renewable energy 
facilities can harm endangered species and adversely modify their 
habitats.29 This section considers the factual clash between renewable 
energy and endangered species, concluding that the effect of renewable 
energy on non-human species is overwhelmingly positive, even 
considering the incidental harms to species from renewable energy 
project development. 
There are unfortunate, but well-understood, conflicts between 
renewable energy development and endangered species. Together, 
renewable energy makes up about 20% of energy generated in the 
 
management, impacts, and decisions).  
 25.  See infra Section I.  
 26.  Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last updated Sept. 13, 
2019).  
 27.  Energy and the Environment Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/where-greenhouse-gases-
come-from.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  For a discussion of the impacts of distributed energy rather than utility-scale facilities, 
see generally J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Distributed Energy and the Endangered Species Act, 4 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 121 (2013). 
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United States.30 Hydropower dams, the oldest and most heavily used 
source of renewable energy, represent about 20% of the world’s total 
power generation31 and approximately 7% of that in the United 
States.32 Unfortunately, endangered fish and marine mammals have no 
way to migrate around dams and are frequently killed in the turbines.33 
Mitigation efforts have proven ineffective;34 still, there is an urgent 
need to expand hydropower capacity.35 For solar power, deserts are the 
sunniest, best places for facilities but are also sensitive ecosystems.36 
Solar power facility construction and operation risk the lives of 
endangered species like tortoises and interfere with their habitats.37 
Meanwhile, the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) estimates that wind 
turbines kill 440,000 birds annually,38 including a number of 
endangered bats.39 Unfortunately, the best areas for wind farms also 
tend to be the areas in which birds fly—as one FWS official pointed 
out, “basically you can overlay the strongest, best areas for wind 
turbine development with the [endangered] whooping crane 
migrations corridor.”40 
Despite its vices, renewable energy has the crucial virtue of 
reducing deadly GHG emissions in contrast to oil, gas, and coal. GHG-
 
 30.  What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last updated Mar. 5, 2021). 
 31.  Anne-Marie Corley, The Future of Hydropower, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 1, 2010, 5:07 
PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/renewables/future-of-hydropower. 
 32.  Hydropower Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/hydropower.cfm (last updated Mar. 30, 2020). 
 33.  Kalyani Robbins, Responsible, Renewable, and Redesigned: How the Renewable Energy 
Movement Can Make Peace with the Endangered Species Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 555, 565 
(2014). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  INTERNATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, 2020 HYDROPOWER STATUS REPORT 
12 (2020) (noting that, in order to limit global temperature rise, “global hydropower capacity 
would need to increase by 25 percent by 2030, and by 60 percent by 2050”). 
 36.  See Matthew Mason, Deserts as Ecosystems, ENVIRONMENTALSCIENCE.ORG, 
https://www.environmentalscience.org/deserts-ecosystems (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (reviewing 
the usefulness of deserts for understanding climate change because of their sensitivity). 
 37.  See infra Section II (discussing the Ivanpah facility and the desert tortoise).  
 38.  BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED LANDS IN THE 
WESTERN UNITED STATES 59–60 (2005). 
 39.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INDIANA BAT (MYOTIS SODALIS), ENDANGERED 
SPECIES, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/mammals/inba/inbafctsht.html (last updated 
Aug. 5, 2019); Brian Handwerk, Wind Turbines Give Bats the “Bends,” Study Finds, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/08/080825-
batbends.html.  
 40.  ROBERT RIGHTER, WINDFALL: WIND ENERGY IN AMERICA TODAY 108 (2011) 
(quoting Tohm Stehn, FWS whooping crane coordinator). 
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caused climate change is the single greatest cause of species 
extinctions—it causes oceans to deoxygenate41 and acidify,42 ice to 
melt,43 seasons to change,44 and a variety of other cascading effects that 
displace, disrupt, and threaten ecosystems.45 Already, one species of 
mammal is known to have been driven extinct due to climate change,46 
and many more extinctions loom imminently.47 Further, extinctions 
will dramatically accelerate as ecosystems lose crucial links that 
preserve longstanding, delicate balances.48 Because renewable energy 
must expand dramatically in order to combat this trend,49 and because 
it has both positive and negative effects, renewable energy’s benefits 
and costs to species should be compared. 
One scholar suggests that it is impossible to conclusively 
determine whether renewable energy helps or hurts species.50 
 
 41.  Craig Welch, Oceans Are Losing Oxygen-and Becoming More Hostile to Life, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150313-oceans-
marine-life-climatechange-acidification-oxygen-fish/. 
 42.  Cheryl Logan, A Review of Ocean Acidification and America’s Response, 60 
BIOSCIENCE 819 (2010). 
 43.  U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, SYNTHESIS & ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 4.2: 
THRESHOLDS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS 2 (2009). 
 44.  U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (Thomas Karl et al. eds., 2009). 
 45.  See, e.g., Hinzman et al., Evidence and Implications of Recent Climate Change in 
Northern Alaska and Other Arctic Regions, 72 CLIMATIC CHANGE 251, 251 (2005). 
 46.  The Bramble Cay melomys, a rodent that lived on a Great Barrier Reef island, was 
declared extinct in 2016 due to rising sea levels. Barrier Reef Rodent is First Mammal Declared 
Extinct due to Climate Change, UNIV. OF QUEENSL. NEWS (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2016/06/barrier-reef-rodent-first-mammal-declared-extinct-
due-climate-change.  
 47.  See Ed Yong, The Bleak Future of Australian Wildlife, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/01/australias-fires-have-been-devastating-for-
wildlife/604837/ (describing numerous species on the brink of extinction due to climate change); 
John McLaughlin et al., Climate Change Hastens Population Extinctions, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. U.S. 6070 (2002) (examining losses in two butterfly species and predicting extinctions driven 
by climate change).  
 48.  Gerardo Ceballos et al., Vertebrates on the Brink as Indicators of Biological Annihilation 
and the Sixth Mass Extinction, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13596, 13596 (2020) (“[S]pecies 
are links in ecosystems, and, as they fall out, the species they interact with are likely to go also.”).  
 49.  Simon Evans, ‘Exceptional new normal’: IEA raises growth forecast for wind and solar 
by another 25%, CARBONBRIEF (May 11, 2021), https://www.carbonbrief.org/exceptional-new-
normal-iea-raises-growth-forecast-for-wind-and-solar-by-another-25. 
 50.  See J.B. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1789 (“First, it would be necessary for the FWS to 
quantify the impact of installed [renewable] power capacity on climate change. . . . Second, it 
would be necessary for the FWS to be able to evaluate the impacts of [reducing climate change] 
on wildlife and habitat in general . . . [a]nd from there, it would be necessary for the FWS to be 
able to conclude that the net impact [] on species balanced against the overall harms to species 
posed by [renewable] power infrastructure comes out on the positive side for species overall. . . . 
[It would be] preposterous [] to suggest that under current climate and species modeling capacity 
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However, some back-of-the-napkin math drawn from climate models 
reveals that the benefits dramatically exceed the costs. While it is 
impossible to be exact, we can use a number of simplifying assumptions 
to get a very rough—but illustrative—estimate of what I call the 
“species-preserving effect” of renewable energy. Confidence in the 
particular numbers should be low because large-scale projections into 
the future involve a tremendous amount of uncertainty, but using the 
best data available at present produces such striking findings that we 
can be confident that the overall species-preserving effect of renewable 
energy is overwhelmingly positive. 
To start, we can estimate the number of species that will go extinct 
due to climate change in various scenarios. One authoritative study 
found that, for currently-predicted climate-warming scenarios for 2050, 
15–37% of species will be “committed to extinction.”51 This figure is 
based on the carbon dioxide already released into the atmosphere as 
well as low, medium, and high-range estimates of carbon projected to 
be released. Once carbon is released, it is virtually impossible to 
remove it from the atmosphere—its future effect on global warming is 
locked in.52 Since species will be driven extinct by rising temperatures 
and the corresponding ecological changes, we can use this data to 
predict about how many species will inevitably be killed due to carbon 
emitted up to 2050.53 Because there are approximately 8.7 million 
species on Earth,54 we can estimate that even low-end warming 
scenarios will result in approximately 1.3 million species extinctions.55 
 
the FWS or any other entity could conclusively support such a finding[.]”). 
 51.  Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 (2004). I 
describe this study as “authoritative” because it has nineteen expert authors, is widely cited with 
approval, and is published in the world’s most respected scientific journal. See Clarivate Analytics, 
“Nature,” 2018 Journal Impact Factor, J. CITATION REPS. (2020) (noting that Nature was the 
world’s most cited scientific journal in 2018 and has an impact rating ranking above the 99th 
percentile for all academic journals). The study has also been able to withstand various criticisms. 
See Thomas et al., Uncertainty in Predictions of Extinction Risk/Effects of Changes in Climate and 
Land Use/Climate Change and Extinction Risk (reply), 430 NATURE 34, 35 (2004) (concluding 
that further investigation “is unlikely to result in substantially reduced estimates of extinction”). 
 52.  This figure incorporates the most likely mitigation efforts in its overall calculation, 
lending further support to the idea of the carbon as being locked in. Id.  
 53.  It is worth noting that many of the extinctions will not occur until after 2050—to say that 
species will be “committed to extinction” is to say that the carbon emissions up to 2050 will set 
into motion a chain of events that will inevitably cause these extinctions. UN Report: Nature’s 
Dangerous Decline ‘Unprecedented’; Species Extinction Rates ‘Accelerating,’ UNITED NATIONS 
(May 6, 2019), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-
unprecedented-report/. 
 54.  Mora et al., How Many Species Are There on Earth and in the Ocean?, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY 
1, 2 (2011). 
 55.  8.7 million species * 15% extinct = 1.305 million species extinctions. This result is not far 
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From these numbers, we can roughly calculate the impact of each 
unit of energy produced by fossil fuels instead of renewable energy. 
The low-end climate scenario used in the above calculations used a 
maximum mean increase in global temperature of 1.7°C. Since a 1.7°C 
increase in temperature amounts to about 1.3 million extinctions, we 
will see on the margin approximately one species extinction for every 
.0000013°C increase in global temperature. The EPA estimates that for 
every 1,500 megawatts (“MW”) of electric generating units (“EGU”) 
from a typical coal-fired power plant, we can expect a .00028°C global 
temperature increase.56 Thus, for every 1,500 MW of EGU using coal, 
we can expect about 215 species extinctions in the future.57 If that is 
true, then approximately every 7 MW of coal installed to meet energy 
demands can be expected to cause, over its lifetime and on the margin, 
one species extinction.58 
This result is itself revealing—the operation of a typical coal plant 
over its lifetime commits hundreds of species to extinction.59 Turning 
back to renewable energy, the analysis up to now suggests that every 7 
MW of energy that could have been provided by renewable energy but 
is instead provided by coal amounts to one species extinction in the 
future due to climate change. For perspective, the U.S.’s three main 
sources of renewable energy currently produce megawatts exceeding 
39,400 times 7.60 In other words, assuming renewable energy displaces 
 
from the UN’s own prediction that human activity is conservatively projected to cause over one 
million species extinctions. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON 
BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT SUMMARY FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 11–12 (2019).  
 56.  Letter from Robert Meyers, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Office of Air & 
Radiation, EPA, to H. Dale Hall, Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., and James Lecky, Dir. of 
Protected Res., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., on “Endangered Species Act and GHG Emitting 
Activities” 5–6 (Oct. 3, 2008). The EPA’s estimate was calculated using emissions numbers that 
were 20 percent greater than those from their considered model facility. Id. n.4 Accordingly, I 
have adjusted their reported maximum global mean temperature increase (.00035°C) downward 
by 20 percent. 
 57.  .00028°C / .0000013°C = approximately 215.  
 58.  1,500 MW / 215 species extinctions = 6.97 MW per species extinction.  
 59.  This finding is in contrast to the EPA’s own opinion that a .00022°C – .00035°C increase 
in temperature would be “extremely small” and therefore unlikely to impact any species. See 
supra note 56 at 8 (“Given the very small global mean climate change magnitudes projected based 
on the emissions of [a singular coal plant], we believe the outputs of such single-source impact 
analysis for other species in other locations would also be of an extremely small magnitude that 
is too small to physically measure or detect.”). 
 60.  See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 2015 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 19 (2016) 
(reporting that the U.S. has a hydropower installed capacity of 102,000 MW); American Wind 
Energy Association, Wind Facts at a Glance, https://www.awea.org/wind-101/basics-of-wind-
energy/wind-facts-at-a-glance (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (reporting that the U.S. has a wind 
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coal usage,61 the operation of renewable facilities in the U.S. currently 
prevents the future extinction of about 39,400 species62—and there is 
room to grow dramatically.63 Meanwhile, the ESA lists (protects) 2,216 
endangered and threatened plant and animal species globally, and only 
58 species have ever been delisted due to recovery.64 The difference in 
magnitude is illustrative—the entire ESA applies to fewer species than 
we can expect a single large hydroelectric station to actually save from 
extinction.65 
Some clarifications about these data are important. This approach 
has involved extrapolating a linear model based on available data and 
assuming marginal effects along the curve.66 Such a model does not tell 
 
operating capacity of 111,808 MW); OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
SOLAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
https://www.energy.gov/eere/solarpoweringamerica/solar-energy-united-states (last visited May 
1, 2020) (reporting that the U.S. has a solar operating capacity of 62,500 MW). (102,000 MW + 
111,808 MW + 62,500 MW) / 7 = 39,472. 
 61.  The actual mechanisms of fossil fuel displacement are influenced by structural, 
institutional, and behavioral factors. Richard York, Do alternative energy sources displace fossil 
fuels? 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 441, 441 (2012); Andrew Jorgenson, Analysing fossil-fuel 
displacement, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 398, 398 (2012). I assume barriers to displacement 
can be overcome with sufficient public will. My analysis revolves around coal because not only is 
it among the most polluting fuels and therefore a priority for phasing out as alternative energy 
expands, but it also appears to be the most prone to displacement. See Jackson et al., Global 
energy growth is outpacing decarbonization, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 120401, 3 (2018) (noting 
the elasticity of coal use).  
 62.  This assumes for simplicity that these renewable energy sources have about zero 
additional carbon costs that are not shared by fossil fuel energy sources. It is uncertain whether 
there may be hidden and unique sources of GHGs in renewable energy sources, but if there are, 
they appear to be relatively negligible. See generally supra note 56 (comparing energy sources and 
carbon emissions). 
 63.  See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROSPECTS: UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, REMAP 2030 ANALYSIS 1 (2015) (noting that the U.S.’s renewable energy 
share in total final energy consumption could cost-efficiently be scaled up from 7.5% to 27% by 
2030 with current technologies). 
 64.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., DELISTED SPECIES, 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/species-delisted (last visited May 1, 2020).  
 65.  The hydroelectric dam I have in mind for this comparison is the Three Gorges Dam. 
The largest hydroelectric facility in the world, it has an installed capacity of 22,500 MW which is 
more than 3,200 times 7–though its actual energy output on any given day may be lower. See 
generally UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THREE GORGES DAM: THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST HYDROELECTRIC PLANT, https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-science-
school/science/three-gorges-dam-worlds-largest-hydroelectric-plant?qt-
science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). Of course, while 
not all facilities can produce nearly as much power as the Three Gorges Dam, the comparison is 
still illustrative; in any case, larger, more productive facilities may yet be developed with 
improving technologies and strengthened public will.  
 66.  For further insight into the capabilities of these kinds of models, see Yi Yang, Two sides 
of the same coin: consequential life cycle assessment based on the attributional framework, 127 J. 
OF CLEANER PRODUCTION 274 (2016) (identifying  
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us where the trigger points actually lie—in other words, we cannot be 
sure that any particular 7 MW of coal will actually cause a species to go 
extinct. In reality there are likely some discontinuities along the curve 
of the model’s line.67 Similarly, given that there are a very large number 
of species spread around the world, we cannot tell which would be the 
next ones to be committed to extinction for any particular temperature 
increase. This is why even minuscule temperature changes will be 
responsible for extinctions—we are talking about the marginal effects 
of changes in cumulative global emissions. For example, perhaps there 
is a species that retreats up mountaintops to get away from warmer 
weather; eventually they will hit the top where there is nowhere else to 
go and then even a tiny change will wipe some out. Elsewhere and at a 
different temperature point perhaps a river will dry up just a bit too 
much or a tidal pool ecosystem will finally succumb to gradual erosion. 
The causes of extinction may be difficult to ascertain directly, even 
among observed species.68 In fact, most extinctions will go totally 
unobserved by humanity.69 Still, extinctions are just as bad whether 
they occur where we can see them or in nature’s many deep recesses.70 
In sum, based on current models representing the best science 
available, the impacts of climate change will cause historic levels of 
species extinctions. While efforts to quantify these losses in terms of 
individual energy facilities are imprecise and use some simplifying 
assumptions,71 they show that extinctions driven by climate change will 
 
 67.  It appears that most extinctions will be clustered near the top of the curve, since the rate 
of extinction will accelerate as more ecosystems begin to collapse. Earlier renewable energy 
projects may therefore have the most positive impact. See generally Ceballos, supra note 48.  
 68.  See, e.g., Barry Sinervo et al., Erosion of Lizard Diversity by Climate Change and Altered 
Thermal Niches, 328 SCIENCE 894 (2010) (demonstrating that extinctions of lizards are at odds 
with direct observations but well-explained by data revealing drops in genetic diversity due to 
climate change).  
 69.  Extinctions will go unobserved whenever they occur among the millions of undiscovered 
species. See Tracy Watson, 86 Percent of Earth’s Species Still Unknown?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/110824-earths-
species-8-7-million-biology-planet-animals-science (discussing undiscovered species).  
 70.  In fact, the extinction of rare, difficult-to-see species may be particularly pernicious. 
Laura Dee et al., When Do Ecosystem Services Depend on Rare Species?, 34 TRENDS IN 
ECOSYSTEM & ECOLOGY 746 (2019). 
 71.  My approach has been to accept the EPA’s own estimates about temperature changes 
from a representative coal plant. A more thorough empirical analysis, perhaps for use in litigation, 
could start with the transient climate response to cumulative emissions. See generally Damon 
Matthews et al., Focus on Cumulative Emissions, Global Carbon Budgets and the Implications for 
Climate Mitigation Targets, 13 ENV’L RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2018). Then the analysis could turn 
to evaluating various representative fossil fuel and renewable facilities to determine a range of 
likely impacts to global temperatures, sensitive to lifetime operation expectancies. Finally, the 
analysis could more closely track species extinctions due to climate change for each marginal 
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vastly outnumber species saved by the ESA, leading to a species clash. 
When the ESA causes renewable energy facilities to be delayed, 
downscaled, or outright prevented to help protect a species, the result 
is the inevitable destruction of many more species. Does the ESA 
really force such apparently self-defeating results? If it does, should it? 
The rest of this paper explores the legal and normative dimensions of 
a species clash under the ESA. 
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
This Section describes the ESA, explains the scope of its 
restrictions, details the impact on renewable energy projects, notes 
possible exemptions, and describes caselaw that reveals an intractable 
priority given to endangered species over most human interests. 
The ESA, signed into law by President Nixon in 1973, imposes two 
major restrictions—there may be no private or public takes of 
endangered or threatened species, and federal agencies must consult 
the FWS or NMFS to determine whether an action might jeopardize a 
listed species or adversely modify their critical habitats.72 While these 
restrictions often overlap, the two sections codifying them 
involvedifferent processes and exemptions, visualized in Figure 1. 
 
increase in various regional surface and ocean temperatures. 
 72.  16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2018). 
Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:50 PM 
392 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:379 
 
Figure 1. 
A. Section 9 “Take” Prohibition 
Section 9 prohibits public and private actors alike from “taking” 
species listed as endangered or threatened by the FWS or NMFS.73 To 
“take” is defined in the statute as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect[.]”74 Agency regulation, upheld by 
the Supreme Court, has interpreted “harm” broadly to include indirect 
damage to species through significant environmental degradation.75 
Habitat destruction that could drive endangered species to extinction 
constitutes “harm” and therefore “taking” under the ESA.76 
Section 9 has no de minimis exception—a take of even one 
individual of a listed species is illegal.77 Instead, the ESA contemplates 
a number of possible exemptions. Section 10(a)(1)(A) gives the FWS 
 
 73.  Id. § 1358.  
 74.  Id. § 1532. 
 75.  See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) 
(interpreting the word “harm” broadly in the ESA). 
 76.  See Palila v. Hawai’i, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “take” was meant 
to be defined in the broadest possible manner, including habitat modification); see also Env’t. 
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
eliminating habitat of species can constitute “taking” that species). 
 77.  See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1793 (“[T]ake is determined at the lowest scale, on the basis 
of impacts to individual species members, and once take is determined to be present it is illegal 
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discretion to permit exceptions to Section 9 restrictions “for scientific 
purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected 
species[.]” More frequently invoked is Section 10(a)(1)(B), under 
which a private actor may take a small and defined number of 
protected animals with an incidental take permit (“ITP”). Incidental 
take “results in, but is not the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise 
lawful activity.”78 Applying for an ITP triggers a rigorous approval 
process requiring the submission of a habitat conservation plan 
(“HCP”), a document that outlines impacts that will likely result from 
the taking, what the applicant will do to minimize and mitigate such 
impacts, adequate funding for mitigation measures, and alternatives 
considered but not adopted.79 
According to the FWS, “[t]he goal of an HCP is to fully offset the 
impacts of take, and every HCP must minimize and mitigate the 
impacts of take to the maximum extent practicable.”80 The FWS will 
approve an HCP if the taking will be incidental, funding for the plan is 
ensured, and the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of 
the survival and recovery of the species. Since granting an ITP is a 
federal action, it implicates other federal environmental laws, like the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and may require the 
submission of an environmental impact statement. 
Unfortunately, the HCP process and its requisite mitigation 
measures can be extremely costly and cause substantial delays that 
frustrate project development. For example, the Ivanpah solar facility 
referenced in this paper’s introduction was delayed, significantly 
downsized, and forced to pay millions of dollars towards conservation 
efforts in order to receive an ITP—and even then, construction was 
completely halted when it had encountered 49 tortoises instead of 38, 
the number specified in the ITP.81 Litigation from conservation groups 
ensued.82 The desert tortoise also struck back against the Calico Solar 
Project, which was completely cancelled after litigation asserted that it 
 
 78.  Glossary, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 
 http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/glossary/index.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2015). 
 79.  16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2018). 
 80.  See generally FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CHAPTER 9: HCP CONSERVATION STRATEGY, 
HCP HANDBOOK, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Handbook-Ch9.pdf 
(last visited May 1, 2020). 
 81.  U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON 
BRIGHTSOURCE ENERGY’S IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM PROJECT (2011). 
 82.  See generally W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
169097 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012). 
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would destroy 4,000 acres of tortoise habitat.83 The project’s primary 
conservation strategy had been to relocate the animals, but 
conservation groups argued that the tortoise survival rate was too 
low.84 The solar company was eventually driven into bankruptcy.85 
B. Section 7 Interagency Consultation Requirement 
Section 7 imposes an additional requirement on federal agencies 
to consult with the FWS using “the best scientific and commercial data 
available” to ensure that they do not “jeopardize” the continued 
existence of listed species or “adverse[ly] modi[fy]” a species’ “critical 
habitat,”86 defined as specific areas essential for the conservation of the 
species.87 Beyond the “no jeopardy” requirement aimed at species 
survival, protection of critical habitat is designed to carve out territory 
necessary for species recovery and eventual delisting.88 
The consultation requirement kicks in automatically for actions 
that could affect any listed species or critical habitat, such as renewable 
energy projects involving public lands occupied by an endangered 
species. If the action is likely to have an adverse effect, a formal 
consultation is required, resulting in a “biological opinion” that 
determines whether the action will jeopardize the species. If an adverse 
modification of a habitat would not jeopardize the species but still 
might result in incidental harm, the FWS issues an incidental take 
statement establishing the terms and conditions under which take may 
occur. 
Even where a “no jeopardy” determination is issued, the Section 
7 process can be burdensome enough to make projects cost prohibitive. 
In fact, one empirical study suggests that the consultation process 
disproportionately restricts renewable energy projects as compared to 
oil, gas, and coal projects.89 Adding to the difficulty is the fact that the 
 
 83.  Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 1, 1, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Abbey, 
No. 2:2012cv02586 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  James Montgomery, K Road Gives Up on Calico Solar Project, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
WORLD (July 1, 2013), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2013/07/01/k-road-gives-up-on-
calico-solar-project/.  
 86.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
 87.  Id. § 1532(5)(a). 
 88.  See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069–72 
(9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing the goals of survival and recovery). 
 89.  Melinda Taylor et al., Protecting Species or Hindering Energy Development? How the 
Endangered Species Act Impacts Energy Projects on Western Public Lands, 46 ELR 10924 (“When 
it applies, the [Section 7] consultation process appears to go quickly and smoothly for the vast 
majority of oil and gas projects, for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, consultation on solar 
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only exemption to Section 7 requires authorization from the 
Endangered Species Committee, scarcely used but infamously known 
as the “God Squad” for its power to permit action jeopardizing the 
existence of a species.90 The Committee may grant an exemption only 
if it finds, among other things, that the agency action has no reasonable 
or prudent alternative, has benefits that clearly outweigh the benefits 
of alternatives consistent with the rest of the ESA, and is of regional or 
national significance.91 The bar for exemption is notoriously high.92 
C. Single-Minded Focus on Species’ Interests 
Not long after the ESA’s passage, the Supreme Court made clear 
that the ESA does not weigh human interests in determining whether 
a violation has occurred. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,93 the 
Court enjoined construction and operation of a dam that was virtually 
complete when an endangered species of snail darter fish was 
discovered in nearby waters. Despite the fact that the dam would 
provide electricity to at least 20,000 homes and Congress had continued 
to fund the dam’s construction after passing the ESA and discovering 
the snail darter, the Court reluctantly94 held “beyond doubt that 
Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of 
priorities[,] . . . whatever the cost[.]”95 Without a permit or “God 
Squad” exemption, no amount of potential gains to humans enables 
bypassing the ESA—the statute simply does not comprehend 
arguments made in those terms.96 This fierce defense of species’ 
 
energy and wind energy projects tends to be lengthy and complicated. . . . This process has, on 
occasion, led to substantial delays and/or major changes to [renewable energy] project location[s] 
and footprint[s].”) 
 90.  The Committee, created by amendment in 1978, has only rendered two final decisions: 
one exemption for Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming, designed to provide power to eight states but 
interfering with the whooping crane’s migration path, and one decision that was eventually 
overturned. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
 91.  16 U.S.C § 1536(e)–(n). 
 92.  See Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How 
the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 858 (1991) (noting that the 
“God Squad” exemption process is burdensome precisely because the bar for jeopardizing species 
must be high to promote the ESA’s conservation efforts).  
 93.  437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 94.  See id. at 172 (“It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number 
of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent 
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 million. . . 
. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require 
precisely that result.”).  
 95.  Id. at 174. 
 96.  At the time Tennessee Valley Authority was decided, the “God Squad” exemption did 
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interests has led to the ESA being known as the “pit bull” of 
environmental laws—unyielding to the point of sometimes being 
overbearing.97 
What is less clear is whether the ESA permits any weighing of non-
human species’ interests. Currently, in almost all cases, the ESA is 
enforced absolutely in “green” contexts as well.98 There may be room 
for some exceptions, however, in the case of a genuine “species 
clash.”99 The next Section of this paper argues that the ESA can and 
should be interpreted to allow sacrifices of members of endangered 
species in order to protect and conserve many more species from going 
extinct from climate change. 
III. HELPING RENEWABLE ENERGY PASS THROUGH 
THE ESA 
This Section considers what room there may be for renewable 
energy projects to leverage their species-preserving benefits to secure 
compliance with the ESA, whether through fast-tracking an ITP, 
lowering an HCP’s mitigation requirements, or modifying the “take” 
and “no jeopardy” prohibitions in some contexts. In other words, there 
may be a “species pass” under the ESA that puts a thumb on the scale 
in favor of renewable energy. First, this Section discusses the purpose 
and policy of the ESA, especially as it applies to climate change; 
second, it considers the ESA’s approach to harming members of 
endangered species in order to protect that species; finally, it considers 
inter-species tradeoffs. I conclude at each stage that renewable energy 
projects may be legally favored under the ESA. 
A. Spirit of the Law  
The ESA expresses the “policy of Congress that all Federal 
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species 
and threatened species,”100 and was enacted “to provide a means 
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and 
 
not yet exist—the 1978 amendment creating the exemption was a direct response by Congress to 
this ruling. See des Rosiers, supra note 92, at 826 (“[A] subsequent United States Supreme Court 
decision in TVA v. Hill prompted Congress to add the process in 1978 and 1979 amendments to 
section 7 [of the ESA].”). 
 97.  Steven Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENV’T. F., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 55. 
 98.  See Nagle, supra note 20, at 98 (“[One approach] is that green harms should be 
prevented even at the cost of foregoing a green benefit. The [ESA] is the most prominent example 
of this approach.”). 
 99.  See infra Section III (for further discussion of this clash). 
 100.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2018). 
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threatened species depend may be conserved.”101 Conservation is 
defined in the statute as “the use of all methods and procedures which 
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to 
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no 
longer necessary[,]” followed by a long list of example procedures 
including, “in the extraordinary case where population pressures 
within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, . . . regulated 
taking.”102 The spirit of the statute was important enough that Congress 
twice explicitly provided that all federal agencies must conform their 
actions to these purposes.103 
One scholar suggests that “the ultimate measure of success or 
failure of [the ESA] is whether the species that are the objects of the 
act’s concern face a more or less secure future.”104 Because this 
approach would artificially impose a binary between success and 
failure, another scholar helpfully clarifies that “the more appropriate 
measure is the number of species whose condition has stabilized or 
improved as a result of ESA protection.”105 This is the simplest and 
most compelling metric for the ESA because it gives appropriate 
weight to the importance of biodiversity.106 Driven by testimony 
emphasizing “the biological problem of extinction[,]”107 Congress 
declared that “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, 
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to 
the Nation and its people[.]”108 Maintaining diversity among species 
 
 101.  Id. § 1531(b).  
 102.  Id. § 1532(3). 
 103.  See id. § 1531(c)(1) (“It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal 
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and 
shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act.”); id. § 1536(a)(1) (“All 
other Federal agencies shall . . . utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act 
by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species[.]”).  
 104.  Michael Bean, Looking Back Over the First Fifteen Years, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK 
OF EXTINCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 38 (Kathryn 
A. Kohm ed., 1991).  
 105.  William Irvin, The Endangered Species Act: Prospects for Reauthorization, in 
TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 644 (McCabe ed., 1992) (emphasis added). Note that under this view, 
tradeoffs among endangered species would be not just permitted but required as a method for 
maximizing the number of species whose condition would improve in the face of climate change-
driven pressures.  
 106.  See des Rosiers, supra note 92, at 827–34 (detailing the direct, indirect, aesthetic, and 
moral benefits of biodiversity that drive the ESA).  
 107.  Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 51 N.D.L REV. 315, 321 (1974) (citing the legislative record, H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)). 
 108.  16 U.S.C § 1531(a)(3).  
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has numerous benefits, not just to humans109 but also (and especially) 
within ecosystems—even rare species often play important roles in 
maintaining complex and essential functionalities.110 Because the 
delicate interactions between species are poorly understood,111 the 
ESA is meant to offer protection that conserves species where possible. 
As discussed at length above, climate change threatens species 
conservation.112 Unfortunately, it does not seem that the federal 
government in 1973 contemplated the eventual necessity of renewable 
energy or the dangers of climate change.113 A search through the 
legislative history of the Act reveals no mention of climate change;114 
furthermore, many of the U.S.’s largest infrastructural projects had 
already been put into place by the time the ESA was passed.115 It makes 
sense that the statute would largely overlook how to resolve species 
conflicts on such a large scale. As lawmakers began to realize the far-
reaching effects of climate change, the listing provision under the ESA 
was broadly construed to include species that will be endangered or 
extinct due to climate change in the foreseeable future.116 In fact, some 
courts have demanded that wildlife agencies consider the impacts of 
climate change in their ESA decision-making.117 In 2019 the FWS 
under President Trump promulgated a regulation that appears to give 
government officials more leeway in dismissing the impacts of climate 
change on species as being outside of the “foreseeable future” for 
listing purposes.118 Extinction from climate change is not an immediate 
event but a process where a species moves from healthy to threatened, 
to endangered, and finally to extinct. The fact that extinction is a 
sequential process suggests that when Congress passed the ESA it 
 
 109.  See generally TEEB, THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND DIVERSITY (2010); see also 
Damian Carrington, What is Biodiversity and Why Does It Matter to Us?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 
12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/12/what-is-biodiversity-and-why-does-it-
matter-to-us. 
 110.  Dee et al., supra note 70. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  See supra Section I.  
 113.  Robbins, supra note 33, at 560–61 (“Climate change mitigation and adaptation were not 
foremost in the minds of the legislators who drafted the statute.”). 
 114.  Id. at 584 n.19. 
 115.  Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1774. 
 116.  See Alaska Oil & Gas v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) (declining to invalidate 
an NMFS listing of the bearded seal as threatened due to climate destruction that is expected to 
occur in 2095). 
 117.  See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007) 
(rejecting a biological opinion for failing to consider the impact of climate change on the delta 
smelt). 
 118.  84 Fed. Reg. 45020, 45021–22 (2019). 
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would have wanted to protect species from climate change. In any 
case—setting aside listing concerns—the crucial question for this paper 
is whether the statute permits harm to some endangered animals in 
order to protect other endangered animals from going extinct from 
climate change. The next two subsections consider this question. 
B. Permits for Takes or Mitigation Measures That Help a Species 
The ESA can permit the infliction of harm to members of an 
endangered species in order to promote that species’ survival. Section 
10(a)(1)(A) gives the FWS discretion to permit exceptions to Section 
9 restrictions “to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected 
species[.]”119 For example, while the ESA normally prohibits the 
importation of trophies from the endangered black rhino, the FWS 
sometimes permits trophy imports because a limited annual Namibian-
government-sponsored hunt of male rhinos improves the overall 
viability of the species.120 
The ITP exception in Section 10(a)(1)(B) is also sometimes 
granted in the spirit of enhancing a species’ survival. In 2002, a 
Sacramento company sought permission to develop a commercial 
resort on nearly 2,000 acres of agricultural land where members of 14 
listed species resided.121 As part of its HCP, the company agreed to 
purchase mitigation land off-site for a conservancy that would provide 
a habitat that is better overall for the species.122 Even after accounting 
for the members of the species that would be killed or displaced during 
the commercial development, the FWS determined that the mitigation 
measure would promote the species’ survival and therefore granted an 
ITP, a decision that withstood scrutiny in federal court.123 
The result is notable for renewable energy. The FWS or NMFS 
may allow companies to interfere with individual members of a listed 
species if either the harm itself or the subsequent mitigation measures 
will ensure or promote that species’ survival.124 This presents an 
opportunity to leverage the species-preserving effect of renewable 
 
 119.  Id.   
 120.  See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BLACK RHINO IMPORT PERMITS FROM NAMIBIA, 
https://www.fws.gov/international/permits/black-rhino-import-permit.html (detailing the FWS’s 
rhino permits under the ESA) (last visited May 1, 2020). 
 121.  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 929 (E.D. Cal. 2004). 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. at 926 (noting that “a habitat conservation plan need not demonstrate the survival 
of individual members of a covered species. Rather, the successful plan must ensure the continued 
viability of covered species, and the Service concluded that the [company’s plan] does just that.”). 
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energy. If a species is threatened by climate change, then a renewable 
energy project that reduces GHG emissions and therefore contributes 
to the species’ survival may be framed in terms that the ESA 
recognizes. 
There are two upshots. First, in cases where the development of a 
renewable energy project interferes with a listed species that is also 
threatened by climate change, the FWS or NMFS may permit take 
either with an ITP that gives weight to the facility’s reduction in GHG 
emissions or under Section 10(a)(1)(A), which does not require the 
lengthy and costly ITP application process.125 Second, the FWS and 
NMFS may also consider offering a new mitigation measure to other 
projects that interfere with species threatened by climate change—
investment in renewable energy. Rather than asking companies to buy 
mitigation land in their HCP, the FWS might consider offering 
“species-preservation credits” proportionate to one’s contribution to 
renewable energy projects. The details of these regimes, e.g., whether 
the credits should be tradable or under what circumstances a company 
should be granted a 10(a)(1)(A) permit rather than an ITP, should be 
explored further in the future. 
This is a result we should expect and hope for. The ESA’s 
protection of a species is counterproductive if it indirectly causes that 
species to go extinct. The exceptions discussed in this subsection, 
however, only apply to tradeoffs within a species. Many other 
renewable energy projects may interfere with listed species that are not 
themselves threatened by climate change. The next subsection 
therefore considers the law surrounding inter-species tradeoffs to 
determine whether renewable energy projects may harm members of 
one species in order to save others from extinction. 
C. Inter-Species Tradeoffs 
A handful of cases in environmental law have considered animal 
species interactions. Most involve managing one non-threatened 
 
 125.  It is possible that in rare cases a species may be so threatened by removals today that 
they will not survive long enough to reap the benefits of reduced GHGs over the coming decades. 
In such cases, it may also be true that the species’ position is so delicate that they are unlikely to 
survive without significant GHG reductions. If so, then the harm resulting from adverse but 
GHG-reducing activities today is unfortunately moot. In any case, the most plausible result from 
the analysis thus far would be that agencies are permitted to use their discretion in either 
direction: they may permissibly allow the GHG-reducing activity that harms the species in the 
present, or they may seek alternative avenues to protect the species. But in the coming sections, 
I argue that even a harm that causes a species to go extinct is permissible and even obligatory 
under both law (Section III(0)) and morality (Section IV) if it prevents the extinctions of many 
more species.  
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species to protect a threatened one.126 The Ninth Circuit has held that 
maintenance of animals (e.g., grazing sheep) in the critical habitat of 
endangered species constitutes a “taking” under the ESA if those 
animals pose a threat to endangered species by their destruction of 
natural habitat.127 Courts even permit killing members of one species 
in order to protect another species. For example, the FWS kills 
common barred owls to reduce ecological competition for the 
endangered spotted owl, a practice upheld by the Ninth Circuit.128 
Thus, among non-endangered species, or between non-endangered 
species and endangered ones, tradeoffs are permitted, widely accepted, 
and sometimes even required. 
Only one case appears to directly consider tradeoffs between two 
endangered species.129 In the Everglades of southern Florida, the Army 
Corps of Engineers developed a series of levees, dams, and gates to 
influence the water’s level and flow.130 Unfortunately, two types of 
endangered birds living in the area each prefer different water levels, 
forcing a difficult choice that will inevitably harm one or the other.131 
In response to an ESA challenge that the chosen water level would 
harm one of the endangered birds, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the 
FWS’s biological opinion that the choice was a temporary measure to 
prioritize the more sensitive species while pursuing a plan that would 
eventually benefit both.132 The FWS was therefore permitted to harm 
one endangered species to protect another without falling afoul of the 
ESA’s take prohibition and “no jeopardy” requirement.133 
The caselaw considered in this section can be synthesized into a 
single broad guiding principle: minimize species’ extinctions. A 
narrower framing would suggest the principle that the needs of the 
 
 126.  See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., EXPERIMENTAL REMOVAL OF BARRED OWLS TO 
BENEFIT THREATENED NORTHERN SPOTTED OWLS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT 461 (2013) (“It is not uncommon to manage one species to protect another species, 
particularly when the species managed is common and the focus species is rare or endangered.”). 
 127.  Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(“The defendants’ action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat is a violation 
of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by the activity.”). 
 128.  See generally Friends of Animals v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 129.  See generally Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 
2009). 
 130.  Id. at 1261. 
 131.  Id. at 1263. 
 132.  Id. at 1271. 
 133.  Id. at 1275 (noting that the incidental take statement was sent back to the FWS for 
revision for being too vague regarding the conditions triggering re-consultation). 
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most sensitive species must come before the needs of the more 
resilient, even where both are endangered. Renewable energy’s 
species-preserving effect is consistent with both of these principles—
harming members of some endangered species may be a necessary 
incidental harm to protect many other species sensitive to extinction 
from climate change. 
A “minimize extinctions” approach to the ESA reflects our 
evolving understanding of ecology and the law. In 1992, the FWS, 
contemplating how to manage endangered species tradeoffs, directed 
each region “to use a multi-species, ecosystem approach to their listing 
responsibilities under the ESA” to be more sensitive to species 
interactions.134 In 1995, the National Resource Council expanded on 
the FWS’s approach and released a report detailing conservation 
conflicts between endangered species.135 It suggested two ecological 
principles for evaluating such conflicts: first, “organisms are 
components of networks in which they interact[;]” second, “species are 
parts of spatial and temporal mosaics.”136 The “most important” lesson 
is that “the resources, interactions, and constraints of endangered 
species can originate in the mosaic in components other than the 
current location of the listed entity.”137 Species conservation efforts 
that view “each species as an entity by itself, with little or no attention 
to the network of interactions,” are likely to fail.138 We should therefore 
not simply consider direct or obvious interactions between species, like 
those where one endangered species preys on another. We must 
instead broaden our approach to species conservation to incorporate 
systematic and potentially unobvious threats. 
The development of climate change science in the 25 years since 
that report represents an extraordinary deepening of our knowledge of 
the “network of interactions” between species consistent with the 
FWS’s multi-species, ecosystem approach. The causes and effects of 
climate change may occur well outside the current location or time of 
some species, but sensible ecological management demands 
consideration of such “outside” influences. Thus, when considering 
how to manage conservation of, e.g., the desert tortoise, the FWS must 
 
 134.  Settlement Agreement, The Fund for Animals v. Lujan, Civ. No. 92-800 (December 15, 
1992). 
 135.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT CHAPTER 6, CONSERVATION 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN SPECIES (1995). 
 136.  Id. at 111. 
 137.  Id. at 112. 
 138.  Id. 
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be sensitive to the way its decisions affect other, potentially distant (in 
space or in time) species, like those threatened by climate change. 
The ESA has been criticized for approaching conservation in a 
rigid, species-centric manner that is inconsistent with a modern, 
network-based understanding of ecology.139 However, the text of the 
ESA does not demand such an antiquated species-specific 
implementation. Its language is, at worst, ambiguous and, at best, 
demanding of a multi-species, ecosystem approach. The reason we see 
a species-centric implementation is not the statute itself but the 
perspectives of those responsible for its implementation.140 
Professor J.B. Ruhl, the only author who has directly considered 
the issue of species tradeoffs under the text of the ESA, asserts that the 
ESA’s language requires species-specific analyses.141 He notes, adding 
emphasis to certain words, that the Section 7 consultation requirement 
states that agencies must determine whether an action is “likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification 
of [critical] habitat of such species.”142 The phrase “such species” refers 
to “any endangered species or threatened species,” which could either 
mean the one species whose existence appears to be currently 
jeopardized by the agency’s action (Professor Ruhl’s interpretation) 
or, more simply, any endangered or threatened species (a multi-species 
interpretation). Under the latter interpretation, an agency action that 
may harm the desert tortoise (for example) demands a consultation 
that is not limited to considering the effect of the action on the desert 
tortoise but also on other endangered or threatened species. This 
interpretation not only benefits from textual validity by giving meaning 
to the phrases in question, but it also has the unique advantage of 
simplicity by refusing to read additional words into the phrase that 
would limit its scope. 
Beyond textual arguments, the single-species ESA interpretation 
 
 139.  See Gary Roemer & Robert Wayne, Conservation in Conflict: The Tale of Two 
Endangered Species, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1251 (2003) (criticizing the ESA’s species-
centric implementation and calling for a move from single-species management to a proactive 
ecosystem approach). 
 140.  See generally TIM CLARK ET AL., ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE 
LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS (1994) (arguing that many problems with the ESA come 
from the perspectives of those responsible for implementing and administering it). 
 141.  Ruhl, supra note 18. 
 142.  Id. at 1790 n.106 (emphasis in original). The Section 9 “take” prohibition uses similar 
language, prohibiting the take of “any endangered [or threatened] species listed pursuant to 
[S]ection 4.” 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2018). 
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collapses when facing endangered species tradeoffs, as seen in the case 
of the Everglades.143 If the FWS had considered lowering the water 
level, the single-species interpretation would only demand evaluating 
the impact on the endangered bird that prefers high water. What about 
the endangered bird that prefers the low water level? The single-
species approach struggles to explain why and how the agency should 
consider both birds. 
One might respond that in this case the ESA demands total 
inaction—changing the water level will harm one bird or the other, 
each of which would violate the law. This approach quickly becomes 
unworkable. Imagine a situation where a flood raises the water level to 
be too high, even for the endangered bird that typically prefers high 
water. Reducing the water level would be better for both species, but 
to different degrees—the high-water-preferring bird benefits less from 
each unit of water reduction compared to the low-water-preferring 
bird. To what level should the water be reduced? The multi-species 
approach readily supplies a framework for discovering an answer—
reduce the water to the level that balances the needs of both species, 
attempting where possible to avoid jeopardizing either’s extinction. 
The single-species approach, however, flounders. As soon as any 
decrease in water level harms the high-water-preferring bird—even to 
a miniscule degree—the FWS must stop, regardless of the potentially 
extraordinary countervailing benefits that would accrue to the low-
water-preferring bird. In fact, if the two birds ecologically compete 
(e.g., over the same food source), then any change in water from the 
flood-state would harm the high-water-preferring bird by 
disproportionately helping its competitor.144 
In cases like this, the single-species interpretation of the ESA 
harms both endangered species, contradicting the statute’s very 
purpose. Besides, determinations of conservation policy should not be 
held hostage by contingent circumstances like water levels. From the 
point of view of species, it does not matter whether the cause of 
extinction is natural or anthropogenic, and neither should it matter 
whether circumstances, like water levels, are brought on by natural 
flooding or environmental managers. Only the multi-species 
interpretation of the ESA makes sense of this intuition by allowing 
 
 143.  See generally Friends of Animals v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 144.  Perhaps the high-water-preferring bird dislikes the flood-state but can barely survive, 
while the low-water-preferring bird will be driven extinct. In this case, the high-water-preferring 
bird wants its competitor to die so that it may ultimately have more access to food.  
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environmental managers to make decisions that are best for as many 
species as possible. 
In addition to the proposed interpretation of the ESA, there is also 
room to consider the species-preserving effect under the “God Squad” 
exemption to the Section 7 “no jeopardy” requirement.145 The 
Endangered Species Committee must consider whether the agency 
action has no reasonable or prudent alternative, has benefits that 
clearly outweigh the benefits of alternatives consistent with the rest of 
the ESA, and is of regional or national significance.146 While the bar is 
high, renewable energy and its species-preserving effect have benefits 
that sometimes clearly outweigh the benefits of alternatives, and are of 
national—indeed, global—significance. The only time the Committee 
issued a valid exemption was to permit construction of a hydropower 
dam that interfered with an endangered bird. The Committee may 
have been further persuaded in that case, and in potential future cases, 
by considering the benefits that would likely accrue to endangered 
species. 
In sum, contrary to the common assumption that the ESA permits 
no weighing among “green” interests, the ESA’s Section 7 and 9 
requirements may permit weighing among the interests of various 
endangered species. A multi-species interpretation is consistent with 
the ESA’s text and purpose, the FWS’s species-management practices, 
caselaw, and the principles of modern ecology.147 There is also room 
for the “God Squad” to weigh the benefits of renewable energy for 
endangered species. The result for renewable energy is hopeful: if a 
renewable energy project can demonstrate that its compliance with the 
ESA with regard to one endangered species would actually endanger 
and eliminate many other species due to climate change, then the ESA 
gives the FWS deference to weigh those tradeoffs by loosening its 
restrictions. The only remaining question is whether environmental 
agencies should loosen restrictions for species preserving renewable 
projects.148 This is the topic of the next section. 
 
 145.  See supra note 90 (describing the exemption). 
 146.  16 U.S.C § 1536(e)–(n). 
 147.  One limitation in the caselaw is that harming one species for the sake of another has not 
yet seriously risked the harmed species’ extinction, and courts have not yet had to explicitly 
consider an ultimatum where one species must go extinct in order to protect other species from 
similar fates. Such conflicts “likely will increase, however, as more species are listed and as species 
and their networks become better understood.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 135. 
 148.  See supra Section I. Of course, asides from normative considerations, the EPA is also 
tasked with using “the best scientific and commercial data available.” It must therefore at least 
recognize such tradeoffs where they occur. 
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IV. NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF A SPECIES CLASH 
The ESA is widely considered the prime example of a statute that 
does not permit potential benefits to be weighed against known costs.149 
It reflects some people’s intuitions that it would be wrong to knowingly 
kill endangered species, no matter the potential gain. For example, one 
commentator maintains that “[t]here are some environmental harms 
that we do not—and should not—tolerate, even at the cost of gaining 
a substantial environmental benefit.”150 Indeed, if one cares about 
animal interests at all, it is difficult to stomach the thought of individual 
tortoises being displaced from their homes or killed by human 
activity.151 At the same time, however, it is also difficult to rationally 
accept the thought of animals being displaced and killed on a mass 
scale because of climate change that could have been avoided or 
mitigated. This poses a normative dilemma that I have called a “species 
clash”: when in conflict, should renewable energy projects that 
substantially reduce GHGs be allowed to harm (or risk harming) 
endangered species, on the grounds that such projects will likely save 
many more species from extinction later? The answer to this question 
is yes, even without accounting for the danger climate change poses to 
humanity. Analyzing the normative dimension of the species clash is 
crucial for well-intentioned environmentalists who have mixed feelings 
about the permissibility of harming the desert tortoise. It will also be 
useful for preparing oneself to advocate for renewable energy, whether 
when litigating, policymaking, or generating public support. 
A. Ethics 
By knowingly inflicting harm on some members of endangered 
species, the hope is that more species will be saved from extinction due 
to climate change. The first issue implicated by the species clash, then, 
is whether to prioritize the one or the many. The second issue is how 
to weigh harms inflicted to species in the present versus harms in the 
future. 
 
 149.  Nagle, supra note 20, at 98. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Of course, some readers may not care about animal interests at all. That belief would 
make this paper’s overall argument easier: if you do not care about animals, you should be in 
favor of policies that allow us to harm animals in order to combat climate change that will 
significantly harm humans. If, on the other hand, you do care about animals, this Section argues 
that you should still be in favor of policies that allow us to harm some animals in order to combat 
climate change that will harm many more animals. 
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The first issue is a debate heavily recited, with consequentialists 
on the one hand who believe that sacrificing a few to save many is not 
just morally permitted, but morally obligatory,152 and deontologists on 
the other who believe that valuable things should never be treated as a 
mere means to an end but should instead always be respected as ends-
in-themselves.153 The conflict between the ESA and renewable energy 
is very much like the classic trolley problem.154 A deadly force—here, 
climate change—is hurtling towards billions of beings; the dilemma is 
whether it is permissible to redirect the harm away from them and 
towards a few—here, by building renewable energy facilities that may 
harm some endangered species. 
 Even in the relatively modest five-to-one trolley problem setup 
involving humans, the philosophical community widely accepts the 
permissibility of sacrificing the few to save the many.155 This makes 
sense: when harm is inevitable, it is generally better to minimize it.156 
Yet the species clash differs from the trolley problem in three 
important ways that push even further in favor of the consequentialist 
position. First, moving the discussion from humans to animals and 
plants makes tradeoffs more morally palatable. Most deontological 
theories assert not only that people are intrinsically valuable, but also 
that our intrinsic value is based on traits that are widely-regarded to be 
unique to humans, like practical rationality, emotional sophistication, 
 
 152.  See, e.g., AVENGERS: INFINITY WAR (Marvel Studios 2018) (“Thanos threatens half the 
universe; one life cannot stand in the way of defeating him.”) (quoting the character Vision). 
 153.  See, e.g., id. (“We don’t trade lives[.]”) (quoting the character Captain America). Note, 
however, that Captain America, living with regret, may have later renounced his deontological 
commitments. See AVENGERS: ENDGAME (Marvel Studios 2019) (“This is the fight of our lives, 
and we are going to win—whatever it takes.”). 
 154.  See generally Judith Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L. J. 1395 (1985). The 
trolley problem is a popular thought experiment in which a runaway trolley is hurtling towards 
five innocent people, and the only way to save them would be to pull a lever switching the trolley 
onto a track with one innocent person. See also Phillipa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the 
Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES (1978) (providing one of the earliest 
framings of the trolley problem). 
 155.  See The PhilPapers Surveys, https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (last visited May 1, 
2020) (reporting that 66.1% of philosophy faculty and PhDs believe we ought to switch a runaway 
deadly trolley away from five people towards one person and only 7.2% accept or lean towards 
not switching). This survey demonstrates a rare degree of consensus for philosophers—out of 30 
queried topics, the only things they are more likely to agree on are that things exist (non-skeptical 
realism about the external world: 76.1%), God does not exist (atheism: 69.7%), science can be a 
source of knowledge (scientific realism: 70.1%), and all bachelors are definitely unmarried (a 
priori knowledge: 78.7%). Id. 
 156.  See David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586, 602 (“[P]ersons [] 
have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of 
others.”). 
Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:50 PM 
408 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXXI:379 
or moral personhood.157 In order to object to sacrificing some animals 
or plants to save more animals or plants, one would need to believe not 
only that animals and plants are intrinsically (not just instrumentally) 
valuable. but also that their intrinsic value supports a deontological 
(not consequentialist) approach to environmental ethics.158 These are 
controversial commitments that further weaken an already tenuous 
deontological approach to the present problem.159 
 Second, by raising the stakes from a few individuals to hundreds 
of thousands of species, each containing some large numbers of 
individual animals or plants, the odds of sacrifice being morally 
permissible soars. Absolutism is increasingly giving way to a more 
moderate position where deontological commitments may be 
permissibly violated when doing so prevents the occurrence of 
sufficiently bad consequences.160 Even renowned deontologist Robert 
Nozick’s commitments begin to waiver in the face of “catastrophic 
moral horror”—an apt characterization of climate change by those who 
value animal and plant interests.161 
Third, the fact that climate change is anthropogenic supports the 
consequentialist approach to environmental ethics. Anthropogenic 
climate change collapses any morally relevant distinction between acts 
and omissions in environmental policymaking—whereas an observer’s 
decision declining to switch a trolley track might, to some 
deontologists, be considered a morally blameless omission,162 our 
decision declining to mitigate climate change is not. Humanity set this 
 
 157.  See, e.g., IMMANUAL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788) (generally 
arguing that deontological ethical commitments follow from humanity’s unique capacity for 
practical reasoning). See also Lori Gruen, The Moral Status of Animals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. Sections 1–2 (Fall 2017) (exploring grounds for the moral consideration of animals and 
their significance on animals’ moral claims). 
 158.  See John Nolt, Nonanthropogenic Climate Ethics, 2 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 701, 703 
(noting that policy recommendations rely both on value theories and ethical theories). For an 
example of a popular and influential consequentialist position, see PETER SINGER, ANIMAL 
LIBERATION (1975). 
 159.  See Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo, Environmental Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. Section 4 (Winter 2020) (summarizing contentious debates about environmental ethics, 
including various weaknesses in environmental deontology). 
 160.  See Tyler Cook, Deontologists Can Be Moderate, 52 J. VALUE INQUIRY 199, 199 (2017) 
(stating that moderate or “threshold” deontology has become a popular alternative the traditional 
hardline stance). 
 161.  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30 (1974) (“The question of whether 
these side constraints are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic 
moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is one I hope largely 
to avoid.”). 
 162.  See Fiona Woolard & Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2016) (exploring the moral relevance of acts and omissions). 
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trolley in motion and caused its breaks to fail, so we cannot be 
blameless by doing nothing at this juncture—we will be responsible 
either for harming individuals like the desert tortoise today or for the 
deaths thousands of species in the future. In other words, the relevant 
question now is not whether to knowingly inflict harm on members of 
species, but how to act given that we will knowingly harm species no 
matter what. The appropriate answer is to act in a way that minimizes 
harm done to species. 
The second issue is how to consider tradeoffs made across 
potentially large spans of time.163 The dominant view in philosophy is 
that future interests ought to be weighed equally to present ones.164 The 
consensus is even stronger among those contemplating the interests of 
non-human species,165 despite what one legal scholar assumes.166 While 
it is true that economists use discount rates to weigh monetary costs 
and benefits that project into the future, this practice is inappropriate 
when weighing non-economic harms, such as the extinctions of 
species.167 It is, therefore, a relatively simple issue to determine 
 
 163.  See generally Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. 
(2015) (examining ethical issues between generations of people).  
 164.  See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 485 (1984) (“[In general,] we ought 
to be equally concerned about the predictable effects of our acts whether these will occur in one, 
or a hundred, or a thousand years. .  . [S]ome of our acts have permanent effects. This would be 
so, for instance, of the destruction of a species, or of much of our environment, or the 
irreplaceable parts of our cultural heritage.”); Nolt, supra note 158, at 703 (“[M]any 
intergenerational ethicists view the discounting of harms and benefits to future people as 
unjustifiable discrimination.”); Dominic Roser, Intergenerational Ethics, ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/explore/savingearth/intergenerational-ethics (last 
accessed Mar. 22, 2021) (“Some critics claim that . . . the concerns of future generations have less 
weight than those of the present. Nevertheless, despite those doubts, most ethicists consider the 
morally appropriate relation to future generations to be a serious topic.”). 
 165.  See Nolt, supra 158 at 707 (“[A]ll nonanthropocentric theories of which we are aware 
would support this two-pronged long-term goal: to maintain or restore both biodiversity and 
climate stability.”). 
 166.  See Ruhl, supra 18, at 1793 (“The ethics of intergenerational policy choices, in this case 
not between human generations but of our fellow species, seem inept at handling a tradeoff 
between avoiding a large probability of dangerous losses to an imperiled species in the present 
versus avoiding a low probability of catastrophic losses to the species in the distant future.”). Since 
the interests of future species are as important as those of present species, policymakers need only 
perform standard risk analyses to determine whether the expected value of an action is positive, 
as though the stakeholders in question were all in the present. Since the harms of climate change 
are so gargantuan and likely to occur, we can be confident that renewable energy projects tend to 
have a positive expected value in terms of species preservation. See supra Section I. Note further 
that the issue is not tradeoffs strictly within a species, but among species generally. See supra 
Section III(C). 
 167.  See Nolt, supra 158, at 703 (“[Economic] discounting can often be justified by the 
dynamics of money (e.g., its tendency to yield return on investment). But in intergenerational 
value theory, which deals with noneconomic harms (e.g., suffering or death) and benefits (e.g., 
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whether harming one species now is permitted to save many more 
species later: how confident are we that our actions will actually save 
more species? Because the species-preserving effect of renewable 
energy projects is overwhelmingly positive, the answer will often be 
very confident.168 Still, there may be cause to hesitate when making 
such determinations as a matter of policy.169 Before we can evaluate 
those concerns, it is important to carefully consider to what extent our 
feelings about the matter are affected by our psychologies. 
B. Psychology 
We may still find ourselves and others reluctant to accept the idea 
of sacrificing the desert tortoise. A basic understanding of the 
psychology involved in a species clash will help not only keep us from 
being steered astray from the correct normative result, but it will also 
help when navigating reluctance from judges, juries, policymakers, and 
voters. 
A number of cognitive biases may be at play when evaluating the 
intuitions surrounding individual members of species. The 
“identifiable victim effect” is the well-studied, but powerful, tendency 
to respond more strongly to a single identified individual at risk than 
to a large group.170 One cause is the affect heuristic, a mental shortcut 
that supplies quick answers to moral problems based on the way those 
problems make us feel in the present.171 Imagining an individual 
animal’s death in detail makes us feel bad and therefore makes us more 
likely to overvalue the event when compared to discussing, in vague 
terms, the death of species by climate change. This is especially likely 
when the animal being considered is “charismatic” and “high profile” 
rather than “obscure.”172 Indeed, a 1990 Department of Interior report 
found that 50 percent of available recovery funds were spent on just 
ten species, contrary to instructions from Congress that prohibit 
 
happiness or health), all justifications for discounting are dubious[.]”). 
 168.  See supra Section I. See also infra Section IV(C) (discussing how policymakers should 
handle borderline cases).   
 169.  See infra Section IV(C) (discussing policy concerns). 
 170.  See generally D. Small et al., Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative 
Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143 (2007) (explaining how humans relate more strongly to the 
individual, rather than a large group (or some other explanatory parenthetical)). 
 171.  See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (discussing 
mental heuristics and biases). 
 172.  TIM CLARK ET AL., ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE LESSONS, 
IMPROVING THE PROCESS 11 (1994). 
Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete) 8/23/2021  4:50 PM 
Spring 2021] MODERNIZING CONSERVATIONISM 411 
considering taxonomic classification in prioritizing recovery plans.173 
This is a classic symptom of scope insensitivity, our psychological 
inability to “feel” the badness of outcomes as scaling up with the 
number of deaths involved.174 In fact, psychological research 
demonstrates “mass numbing”—a person’s willingness to pay to save 
other people from some risk actually tends to decrease as the number 
of people at risk grows beyond ten or so.175 This same phenomenon has 
been shown to apply in environmental contexts when valuing animal 
lives,176 so it is not hard to imagine it influencing one’s willingness to 
sacrifice for the sake of preventing climate change. 
Biases do not just affect our moral reasoning—they also can 
distort our predictions of the future. For example, the availability 
heuristic is our tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with 
greater “availability” in memory, which can be influenced by how 
unusual or emotionally charged they may be or how recently we have 
experienced them.177 We may overestimate the likelihood of a solar 
facility harming a desert tortoise based on the tortoise’s peculiar 
circumstances, appearance, or familiarity while we underestimate the 
likelihood of extinctions from climate change because we do not “see” 
them happening around us. These are considerations that must be kept 
in mind when we find ourselves viscerally hesitant to accept the 
sacrifice of some members of species in the present for the sake of 
many more species in the future. 
 
 173.  C. Griffin & T.W. French, Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species and Their 
Habitats by State Regulations: The Massachusetts Initiative, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTY-
SEVENTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE (R. McCabe 
ed. 1992). 
 174.  One compelling explanation for scope insensitivity is given by Eliezer Yudkowski, 
Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks at 16, in GLOBAL 
CATASTROPHIC RISKS (Nick Bostrom & Milan  irokvi  eds., 2008) (“Human emotions take place 
within an analog brain. The human brain cannot release enough neurotransmitters to feel 
emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from 
10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination 
to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over[.]”). 
 175.  Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide, 2 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79 (2007); see Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass 
Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 126 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (finding 
that people are most willing to pay to save groups of around ten people, but that they become less 
willing to pay to save larger groups of people than they are willing to pay to save one or two 
individuals). 
 176.  See E. Markowitz et al., Compassion Fade and the Challenge of Environmental 
Conservation, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 397 (2013) (finding that across several studies, 
“compassion shown towards animals in need of aid decreased as the number of victims increased, 
identifiability of the victims decreased and the proportion of animals helped shrank”). 
 177.  KAHNEMAN, supra note 171.   
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C.  Policy 
Even if one accepts that we should be ethically willing to sacrifice 
a species now for the sake of a species later, one might think that 
enshrining this approach in policy is risky or counterproductive. I 
consider and ultimately reject reasons for holding that view. 
The ESA is in most cases a useful statute. Prohibitions against 
harming endangered species usefully prevent the rampant or arbitrary 
destruction of such species. In the present, one function of the ESA is 
to steer all project development—renewable energy-related or not—
away from sites where there are endangered animals. Additionally, the 
ESA has a technology-forcing effect—since the costs of harming 
endangered species are high, companies are incentivized to invest in 
less invasive technologies and methods.178 The ESA is thus useful for 
protecting species from projects that do not have a species-preserving 
effect, such as fossil fuel projects. But as it is currently enforced, the 
ESA is not fine-grained enough to filter out the bad from the good. In 
a hypothetical world where the threat of climate change was less dire 
or where the costs of ESA compliance were lower, it would be noble 
to insist on siting renewable energy projects elsewhere and on stringent 
mitigation measures. But in our world, the pressure on renewable 
energy projects is unjustifiably excessive and self-defeating. 
To secure the interests of endangered species in the present, 
Congress could instead create positive incentives for renewable energy 
projects that site away from endangered species or adopt mitigation 
measures. The ESA currently only functions as a negative incentive 
that imposes costs and barriers to projects that may impose harm on 
endangered species. By switching to a positive incentive structure for 
renewable energy (e.g., a large monetary award for renewable energy 
projects that site away from endangered species or adopt mitigation 
technologies), the destruction of species for mere convenience would 
have considerable opportunity costs that would steer firms away from 
harming endangered species where feasible. A positive incentive 
structure would better recognize the need to rapidly develop 
renewable energy. 
Some commentators argue against an exceptional treatment of 
renewable energy compared to other projects under the ESA, claiming 
that a double standard undermines the legitimacy of environmental 
 
 178.  See Robbins, supra note 33 (mentioning, among other things, the development of wind 
turbines that are encased in a shell to prevent harms to birds/bats). 
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law.179 A double standard “implies that two things which are the same 
are measured by different standards.”180 By contrast, recognizing a 
species-preserving effect under the ESA measures two different things 
(projects that help species and those that hurt them) by a singular 
standard (their effects on species). Giving weight to species 
preservation is no more a double standard than is a carbon tax, which 
imposes higher fees on actors that burn more fossil fuels. Furthermore, 
not all double standards are bad—for example, progressive tax policies 
are widely accepted even though they set different marginal tax rates 
on taxpayers with different levels of income. Giving a project more 
favorable treatment for its species-preserving effect is normatively 
justified and likely to promote, rather than undermine, environmental 
law’s legitimacy by maximally protecting environmental interests. 
Other commentators worry about line-drawing.181 It may be 
difficult to avoid the misapplication of a “species pass” to projects that 
actually have no species-preserving effect. For example, a renewable 
energy project that requires a substantial amount of GHGs to be 
produced in its construction but that would only produce a small 
amount of clean energy might have no species-preserving effect and 
therefore not be the appropriate beneficiary of a species pass. Further, 
a fossil fuel power plant using advanced emissions control technologies 
might assert that the adoption of clean technology is species-preserving 
relative to other fossil fuel power plants. Distinguishing when and how 
to offer favorable treatment under the ESA will need to be laid out in 
detail once the practice becomes more widespread, but the challenge 
is far from insurmountable. After all, a project’s species-preserving 
effect is an empirical issue that can be predicted on the basis of the best 
data available. And we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the 
good—the risk that a few marginally harmful projects slip through is of 
relatively little consequence if the policy results in an enormous influx 
of clean, species-preserving energy. 
There will be no perfect outcome. Our decisions about climate 
change will be felt by generations of both humans and animal species. 
We owe it to all of them to make necessary sacrifices and take 
 
 179.  See Nagle, supra note 20 (“[T]he special treatment that wind and solar energy facilities 
have received [is taken as] evidence that environmental law is only employed against disfavored 
parties[.] . . . Such rule of law concerns counsel against allowing only green benefits to trump 
green harms, for they undermine the legitimacy of the law’s efforts to prevent those green 
harms.”). 
 180.  MARGARET EICHLER, THE DOUBLE STANDARD: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST 
SOCIAL SCIENCE 15 (1980). 
 181.  See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1792–93. 
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calculated risks. Tragically, some of these may involve the loss of 
species today, such as individual Mojave desert tortoises. Our solace 
must be that posterity will be ever grateful for the multitude of species 
that will live on as a result. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmentalists are understandably confounded by the conflict 
posed between endangered species and renewable energy projects. 
Although it is preferable to save as many species as possible and 
although renewable energy projects have a species-preserving effect, 
the ESA currently stands in the way of renewable energy projects that 
have a powerful species-preserving effect. This paper has articulated 
an interpretation of the ESA that would resolve this apparent 
contradiction and yield a more sensible approach to both climate 
change and the protection of species by framing both the ESA and 
renewable energy in terms of species preservation. The term “species,” 
to which the ESA applies, includes those which will be affected by 
climate change; as a result, agencies should consider tradeoffs between 
species sited near potential renewable energy projects and those who 
will be driven extinct without the construction of that project. The 
species-preserving effect is also relevant under the Section 7 “God 
Squad” exemption and Section 9 mitigation measures. At all times, the 
goal of agencies enforcing the ESA must be the same as it always has 
been: minimizing species extinctions and maximizing biodiversity. 
The broader theme of this paper has been that climate change has 
dire consequences even for nonhumans. Taking these risks seriously 
suggests that there is a need to radically change our approaches to 
weighing costs and benefits in conservationist policymaking. There is 
no costless solution to climate change; yet determinations that there 
are any costs whatsoever currently preclude actions which are 
necessary to unlock the overwhelming benefits of climate change 
mitigation. Our methods of protecting species must evolve as our 
impact on their ecosystems intensifies. 
 
